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1 Introduction
This article relates equilibria and distributed knowledge. In game theoretical
situations among a group of players, the concept of mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium has become central. Yet little is known the process by which players
learn if they do. This article will give a protocol run by the mutual learning of
their beliefs of players’ actions, and it highlights an epistemic aspect of Bayesian
updating process leading to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for a strategic
form game.
As for as J.F. Nash [8] $s$ fundamental notion of strategic equilibrium is con-
cerned, R.J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger [1] gives epistemic conditions for
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: They show that the common-knowledge of the
predictions of the players having the partition information (that is, equivalently,
“ This paper was presented in WINE 2005, 15-17 December 2005, Hong Kong, China
([6])
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the S5-know1edge model) yields a Nash equilibrium of a game. However it is
not clear just what learning process leads to the equilibrium. The present article
aims to fill this gap from epistemic point of view.
Our real concern is with what Bayesian learning process leads to a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of a finite strategic form game with e\’ephasis on
the epistemic point of view. We focus on the Bayesian belief revision through
communication among group of players. We show that
Main theorem. Suppose that the players in a strategic form game have the
p-belief system with a common prior distmbution. In a communication process
of the game according to a protocol with revisions of their beliefs about the other
players’ actions, the profile of their future predictions induces a $\gamma nixed$ strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game in the long run.
Let us consider the following protocol: The players start with the same prior
distribution on astate-space. In addition they have private information given
by apartition of the state space. Beliefs of players $axe$ posterior probabilities: A
player $prightarrow believes$ (simply, believes) an event with $0<p\leq 1$ if the posterior prob-
ability of the event given $his/her$ information is at least $p$ . Each player predicts
the other players’ actions as $his/her$ belief of the actions. $He/she$ communicates
privately their beliefs about the other players’ actions through messages, and
the receivers update their belief according to the messages. Precisely, the play-
ers are assumed to be rational and maximizing their expected utility according
their beliefs at every stage. Each player communicates privately $his/her$ belief
about the others’ actions as messages according to aprotocol,3and the receivers
update their private information and revise their belief.
The main theorem says that the players’ predictions regarding the future
beliefs converge in the long run, which lead to amixed strategy Nash equilibrium
of agame. The emphasis is on the two points: First that each player’s prediction
is not required to be common-knowledge among all players, and secondly that
each player send to the another player not the exact information about $his/her$
belief about the actions for the other players but the approximate information
about the the other players’ actions with probability at lest $his/her$ belief of the
others’ actions.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2we give the formal model of
the Bayesian communication on agame. Section 3states explicitly our thmrem
and gives asketch of the proof. In final section 4we conclude some remarks. We
are planning to present asmall example to illustrate the theorem in our lecture
presentation in the Kyoto Symposium ‘Mathematical Economics.’
2 The Model
Let $\Omega$ be a non-empty finite set called a state-space, $N$ a set of finitely many
players $\{1, 2, \ldots n\}$ at least two $(n\geq 2)$ , and let $2^{\Omega}$ be the family of all subsets
3 When a player communicates with another, the other players are not informed about
the contents of the message.
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of $\rfloor\Omega$ . Each member of $2^{\Omega}$ is called an event and each element of $\Omega$ called a
state. Let $\mu$ be a probability measure on $\Omega$ which is common for all players.
For simplicity it is assumed that $(\Omega, \mu)$ is a finite probability space with $\mu$ full
suppart.4
2.1 p-Belief System5
Let $p$ be a real number with $0<p\leq 1$ . The p-belief system associated with the
partition information structure $(\Pi_{i})_{i\in N}$ is the tuple $\langle N, \Omega, \mu, (\Pi_{i})_{i\in N}, (B_{i}(*,p))_{i\in N}\rangle$
consisting of the following structures and interpretations: $(\Omega,\mu)$ is a finite prob-
ability space, and $is$ p-belief opemtor $B_{i}(*;p)$ is the operator on $2^{\Omega}$ such that
$B_{i}(E,p)$ is the set of states of $\Omega$ in which $i$ p-believes that $E$ has occurred with
probability at least $p$ ; that is, $B_{i}(E;p)$ $:=\{\omega\in\Omega|\mu(E|\Pi_{i}(\omega))\geq p\}$ .
Remark 1. When $p=1$ the l-belief operator $B_{i}(*;1)$ becomes knowledge oper-
ator.
2.2 Game on p-Belief System6
By agame $G$ we mean afinite strategic form game $(N, (A_{i})_{i\in N},$ $(g_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ with the
following structure and interpretations: $N$ is afinite set of playelS $\{1, 2, \ldots, i, \ldots n\}$
with $n\geq 2,$ $A_{i}$ is afinite set of $i’ s$ actions (or $i’ s$ pure strategies) and $g_{i}$ is an $i’ s$
payoff function of $A$ into $R$ , where $A$ denotes the product $A_{1}\cross A_{2}\cross\cdots\cross A_{n}$ ,
$A_{-i}$ the product $A_{1}\cross A_{2}\cross\cdots\cross A_{i-1}\cross A_{i+1}\cross\cdots\cross A_{n}$ . We denote by $g$ the
$n$-tuple $(g_{1},g_{2}, \ldots g_{n})$ and by $a_{-i}$ the $(n-1)$-tuple $(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{i-1},a_{i+1}, \ldots, a_{n})$
for $a$ of A. Furthermore we denote $a_{-I}=(a_{i})_{i\in N\backslash I}$ for each $I\subset N$ .
Aprobability distribution $\phi_{i}$ on $A_{-i}$ is saId to be $i’ s$ overall conjecture (or
simply $i’ s$ conjecture). For each player $j$ other than $i$ , this induces the marginal
distribution on $j’ s$ actions; we call it $i’ s$ individual conjecture about $j$ (or simply
$i’ s$ conjecture about $j.$ ) Functions on $\Omega$ are viewed like random variables in the
probability space $(\Omega, \mu)$ . If $x$ is asuch function and $x$ is avalue of it, we denote
by $[x=x]$ (or simply by $[x]$ ) the set $\{\omega\in\Omega|x(\omega)=x\}$ .
The information structure $(\Pi_{i})$ with acommon prior $\mu$ yields the distribution
on $A\cross\Omega$ defined by $q_{i}(a,w)=\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{i}(\omega))$ ;and the $i’ s$ overall conjecture
defined by the marginal distribution $q_{i}(a_{-i},\omega)=\mu([a_{-i}=a_{-i}]|\Pi_{i}(\omega))$ which
is viewed as arandom variable of $\phi_{i}$ . We denote by $[q_{i}=\phi_{i}]$ the intersection
$\bigcap_{a-:\in A-:}[q_{i}(a_{-i})=\phi_{i}(a_{-i})]$ and denote by $[\phi]$ the intersection $\bigcap_{i\in N}[q_{i}=\phi_{t}]$ .
Let $g_{i}$ be arandom variable of $i’ s$ payoff function $g_{i}$ and $a_{i}$ arandom variable of
an $i’ s$ action $a_{i}$ . Where we assume that $\Pi_{i}(\omega)\subseteq[a_{i}]$ $:=[a_{i}=a_{i}]$ for all $\omega\in[a_{i}]$
and for every $a_{i}$ of $A_{i}.i’ s$ action $a_{i}$ is said to be actual at astate $\omega$ if $\omega\in[a_{i}=a_{i}]$ ;
and the profile $a_{I}$ is said to be actually played at $\omega$ if $\omega\in[a_{I}=a_{I}]$ $:= \bigcap_{i\in I}[a_{i}=$
$a_{i}]$ for $I\subset N.$ The pay off functions $9=(g_{1},g_{2}, \ldots,g_{n})$ is said to be actually
4 That is; $\mu(\omega)\neq 0$ for every $\omega\in\Omega$ .
5 Monderer and Samet [7].
6 Aumann and Brandenburger [1]
181
played at a state $\omega$ if $\omega\in[g=g]$ $:= \bigcap_{i\in N}[g_{i}=g_{i}]$ . Let Exp denote the
expectation defined by $Exp(g_{i}(b_{i}, a_{-i});\omega)$ $:=$ $\sum_{a-:\in A-i}g_{i}(b_{i}, a_{-i})q_{i}(a_{-i},\omega)$ .
A player $i$ is said to be mtional at $\omega$ if each $i’ s$ actual action $a_{i}$ maximizes
the expectation of his actually played pay off function $g_{i}$ at $\omega$ when the other
players actions are distributed according to his conjecture $q_{i}$ $($ . ; $\omega)$ . Formally,
letting $g_{i}=g_{i}(\omega)$ and $a_{i}=\Re(\omega),$ $Exp(g_{i}(a_{i}, a_{-i});\omega)\geq Exp(g_{i}(b_{i}, a_{-i});\omega)$ for
every $b_{i}$ in $A_{i}$ . Let $R_{i}$ denote the set of all of the states at which $i$ is rational.
2.3 Protocol 7
We assume that the players communicate by sending messages. Let $T$ be the time
horizontal line $\{0,1,2, \cdots t, \cdots\}$ . A protocol is a mapping $Pr$ : $Tarrow N\cross N,trightarrow$
$(s(t),r(t))$ such that $s(t)\neq r(t)$ . Here $t$ stands for time and $s(t)$ and $r(t)$ are,
respectively, the sender and the receiver of the communication which takes place
at time $t$ . We consider the protocol as the directed graph whose vertices are the
set of all players $N$ and such that there is an edge (or an arc) from $i$ to $j$ if and
only if there are infinitely many $t$ such that $s(t)=i$ and $r(t)=j$ .
A protocol is said to be fair if the graph is strongly-connected; in words,
every player in this protocol communicates directly or indirectly with every
other player infinitely often. It is said to contain a cycle if there are players
$i_{1},$ $i_{2},$
$\ldots$ , $i_{k}$ with $k\geq 3$ such that for all $m<k,$ $i_{m}$ communicates directly with
$i_{m+1}$ , and such that $i_{k}$ communicates directly with $i_{1}$ . The communications is
assumed to proceed in rounds8
2.4 Communication on p-Belief System
A Bayesian belief communication process $\pi(G)$ with revisions of players’ conjec-
tures $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in N\cross T}$ according to a protocol for a game $G$ is a tuple
$\pi(G)=(Pr, (\Pi_{i}^{t})_{i\in N},$ $(B_{i}^{t})_{i\in N},$ $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in N\cross T}\rangle$
with the following structures: the players have a common prior $\mu$ on $\Omega$ , the
protocol $Pr$ among $N,$ $Pr(t)=(s(t), r(t))$ , is fair and it satisfies the conditions
that $r(t)=s(t+1)$ for every $t$ and that the communications proceed in rounds.
The revised information structure $\Pi_{i}^{t}$ at time $t$ is the mapping of $\Omega$ into $2^{\Omega}$ for
player $i$ . If $i=s(t)$ is a sender at $t$ , the message sent by $i$ to $j=r(t)$ is $M_{i}^{t}$ . An
n-tuple $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{i\in N}$ is a revision process of individual conjectures. These structures
are inductively defined as follows:
-Set $\Pi_{i}^{0}(w)=\Pi_{i}(\omega)$ .
-Assume that $\Pi_{i}^{t}$ is defined. It yields the distribution $q_{i}^{t}(a,\omega)=\mu([a=$
$a]|\Pi_{i}^{t}(w))$ . Whence
7 C.f.: Parikh and Krasucki [9]
8 There exists a time $m$ such that for all $t,$ $Pr(t)=Pr(t+m)$ . The period of the
protocol is the minimal number of all $m$ such that for every $t,$ $Pr(t+m)=Pr(t)$ .
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$\bullet$ $R_{i}^{t}$ denotes the set of all the state $\omega$ at which $i$ is rational according to
his conjecture $q_{i}^{t}$ $($ . ; $\omega)$ ; that is, each $is$ actual action $a_{i}$ maximizes the
expectation of his pay off function $g_{i}$ being actually played at $\omega$ when the
other players actions are distributed according to his conjecture $q_{i}^{t}(\cdot ; \omega)$
at time $t^{9}$
$\bullet$ The message $M_{i}^{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ sent by the sender $i$ at time $t$ is defined by
$M_{i}^{t}( \omega)=\bigcap_{a-:\in A_{-i}}B_{i}^{t}([a_{-i}];q_{i}^{t}(a_{-i},w))$
,
where $B_{i}^{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ is defined by
$B_{i}^{t}(E;p)=\{\omega\in\Omega|\mu(E|\Pi_{i}^{t}(\omega))\geq p\}$ .
Then:
-The revised partition $\Pi_{i}^{t+1}$ at time $t+1$ is defined as follows:
$\bullet$ $\Pi_{i}^{t+1}(w)=\Pi_{i}^{t}(\omega)\cap M_{s(t)}^{t}(\omega)$ if $i=r(t)$ ;
$\bullet$ $\Pi_{i}^{t+1}(\omega)=\Pi_{i}^{t}(\omega)$ otherwise,
- The revision process $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in N\cross T}$ of conjectures is inductively defined as
follows:
$\bullet$ Let $\omega_{0}\in\Omega$ , and set $\phi_{s(0)}^{0}(a_{-s(0)})$ $:=q_{s(0)}^{0}(a_{-s(0)},\omega_{0})$
$\bullet$ Take $\omega_{1}\in M_{\epsilon(0)}^{0}(\omega_{0})\cap B_{r(0)}([g_{s(0)}]\cap R_{s(0)}^{0}; p)^{10}$ and set $\phi_{s(1)}^{1}(a_{-s(1)})$ $:=$
$q_{s(1)}^{1}(a_{-s(1)},w_{1})$
$\bullet$ Take $\omega_{t+1}\in M_{s(t)}^{t}(\omega_{t})\cap B_{r(t)}([g_{s(t)}]\cap R_{s(t)}^{t};p)$ , and set $\phi_{s(t+1)}^{t+1}(a_{-s(t+1)})$ $:=$
$q_{i}^{t+1}(a_{-\epsilon(t+1)},\omega_{t+1})$ .
The specification is that a sender $s(t)$ at time $t$ informs the receiver $r(t)his/her$
individual conjecture about the other players’ actions with a probability greater
than $his/her$ belief. The receiver revises $her/his$ information structure under the
information. $She/he$ predicts the other players action at the state where the
player p-believes that the sender $s(t)$ is rational, and $she/he$ informs $her/his$ the
predictions to the other player $r(t+1)$ .
We denote by $\infty$ a sufficient large $\tau$ such that for all $w\in\Omega,$ $q_{i}^{\tau}($ . ; $\omega)=$
$q_{i}^{\tau+1}$ $($ . ; $\omega)=q_{i}^{\tau+2}(\cdot ; \omega)=\cdots$ . Hence we can write $q_{i}^{\tau}$ by $q_{i}^{\infty}$ and $\phi_{i}^{\tau}$ by $\phi_{i}^{\infty}$ .
Remark 2. The Bayesian belief communication is a modification of the commu-
nication model introduced by Ishikawa [3].
9 Formally, letting $g_{i}=g_{i}(w),$ $a_{i}=a_{i}(\omega)$ , the expectation at time $t,$ $Exp^{t}$ , is $d\triangleright$
fined by $Exp^{t}(g_{*}(a_{i},a_{-i});\omega)$ $:=$ $\sum_{a-:\in A-i}g_{i}(a_{i}, a_{-i})q_{i}^{t}(a_{-i},w)$ . An player $i$ is
said to be rational according to his conjecture $q^{t}$. $($ . , $\omega)$ at $w$ if for all $b_{i}$ in $A_{:}$ ,
Exp $(g_{l}(a_{i},a_{-i});w)\geq Exp^{t}(g_{i}(b_{i},a_{-i});w)$ .
10 We denote $[g_{i}];=[g_{i}=9i]$
183
3 The Result
We can now state the main theorem :
Theorem 1. Suppose that the players in a stmtegic form game $G$ have the p-
belief system with $\mu$ a common prior. In the Bayesian belief communication
process $\pi(G)$ according to a protocol among all players in the game with revisions
of their conjectures $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{(i,t)\in N\cross T}$ there evists a time $\infty$ such that for each $t\geq\infty$ ,
the n-tuple $(\phi_{i}^{t})_{i\in N}$ induces a mixed stmtegy Nash equilibrium of the game.
The proof is based on the below proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the players in a strategic form game have the
p-belief system with $\mu$ a common prior. In the Bayesian belief communication
process $\pi(G)$ in a game $G$ with revisions of their conjectures, if th$e$ protocol
has no cycle then both the conjectures $q_{i}^{\infty}$ and $q_{j}^{\infty}$ on $A\cross\Omega$ must coincide;
that is, $q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega_{\infty})=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega_{\infty+t})$ for $(i,j)=(s(\infty), s(\infty+t))$ and for any
$t=1,2,3,$ $\cdots$ .
Proof. Let us first consider the case that $(i,j)=(s(\infty), r(\infty))$ . We denote
$W_{i}^{\infty}(w)=\{\xi\in\Omega|M_{i}^{\infty}(\xi)=M_{i}^{\infty}(w)\}$ .
In view of the construction of $\{\Pi_{i}^{t}\}_{t\in T}$ we can observe that
$\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)\subseteq W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ for all $\xi\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ . (1)
It immediately follows that $W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ is decomposed into a disjoint union of com-
ponents $\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi)$ for $\xi\in\Pi_{i}^{\infty}(w)$ ;
$W_{i}^{\infty}( \omega)=\bigcup_{k=1,2,,m}\ldots\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi_{k})$
where $\xi_{k}\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ . (2)
It can be observed that
$\mu([a=a]|W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega))=\sum_{k=1}^{m}\lambda_{k}\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{j}^{\infty}(\xi_{k}))$ (3)
for some $\lambda_{k}>0$ with $\sum_{k=1}^{m}\lambda_{k}=1^{11}$ Since $\Pi_{i}(\omega)\subseteq[a_{i}]$ for all $\omega\in[a_{i}]$ , we
can observe that $q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i};w)=q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)$ . On noting that $W_{i}^{\infty}(w)$ is decomposed
into a disjoint union of components $\Pi_{i}^{\infty}(\xi)$ for $\xi\in\Pi_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ , we can obtain
$q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)=\mu([a=a]|W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega))=\mu([a=a]|\Pi_{i}^{\infty}(\xi_{k}))$ for any $\xi_{k}\in W_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ . It
follows by (3) that, for each $\omega\in\Omega$ there exists a state $\xi_{\omega}\in\Pi_{i}^{\infty}(\omega)$ such that
$q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)\leq q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{\omega})$ for $(i,j)=(s(\infty), t(\infty))$ .
On continuing this process according to the fair protocol, the below facts
can be plainly verified: For each $w\in J\Omega$ and for sufficient large $\tau\geq 1$ ,
11 This property is called the convexity for the conditional probability $\mu(X|*)$ in Parikh
and Krasucki [9].
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1. For any $t\geq 1,$ $q_{s(\infty)}^{\infty}(a;\omega)\leq q_{s(\infty+t)}^{\infty}(a;\xi_{t})$ for some $\xi_{t}\in\Omega$ ; and
2. $q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega)\leq q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\xi)\leq q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\zeta)\leq,$ . . for some $\xi,$ $\zeta,$ $\cdots\in\Omega$ .
Since $\Omega$ is finite it can be obtained that $q_{i}^{\infty}(a;\omega_{\infty})=q_{j}^{\infty}(a;\omega_{\infty+t})$ for $(i,j)=$
$(s(\infty), s(\infty+t))$ for every $a$ , in completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1: We denote by $\Gamma(i)$ the set of all the players who directly
receive the message ffom $i$ on $N$ ; i.e., $\Gamma(i)=\{j\in N|(i, j)=Pr(t)$ for some $t\in$
$T\}$ . Let $F_{i}$ denote $[\phi_{i}^{\infty}]$ $:= \bigcap_{a-:\in A_{i}}[q_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i}; *)=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})]$ . It is noted that
$F_{i}\cap F_{j}\neq\emptyset$ for each $i\in N,$ $j\in\Gamma(i)$ .
We observe the first point that for each $i\in N,$ $j\in\Gamma(i)$ and for every $a\in A$ ,
$\mu([a_{-j}=a_{-j}]|F_{i}\cap F_{j})=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-j})$ . Then summing over $a_{-i}$ , we can observe that
$\mu([g=a_{i}]|F_{i}\cap F_{j})=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ for any $a\in A$ . In view of Proposition 1 it can
be observed that $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})=\phi_{k}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ for each $j,$ $k,$ $\neq i$ ; I.e., $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ is independent
of the choices of every $j\in N$ other than $i$ . We set the probability distribution
$\sigma_{i}$ on $A_{i}$ by $\sigma_{i}(a_{i})$ $:=\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i})$ , and set the profile $\sigma=(\sigma_{i})$ .
We observe the second point that for every $a \in\prod_{i\in N}Supp(\sigma_{i}),$ $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=$
$\sigma_{1}(a_{1})\cdots\sigma_{i-1}(a_{i-1})\sigma_{i+1}(a_{t+1})\cdots\sigma_{n}(a_{n})$ : In fact, viewing the definition of $\sigma_{i}$
we shall show that $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=\prod_{k\in N\backslash \{i\}}\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{k})$ . To verify this it suffices to
show that for every $k=1,2,$ $\cdots$ , $n,$ $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-i})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})\prod_{k\in I_{k}\backslash \{i\}}\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{k})$ : We
prove it by induction on $k$ . For $k=1$ the result is immediate. Suppose it is true
for $k\geq 1$ . On noting the protocol is fair, we can take the sequence of sets of
players $\{I_{k}\}_{1\leq k\leq n}$ with the following properties:
(a) $I_{1}=\{i\}\subset I_{2}\subset.$ . . $\subset I_{k}\subset I_{k+1}\subset.$ . . $\subset I_{m}=N$ :
(b) For every $k\in N$ there is a player $i_{k+1} \in\bigcup_{j\in I_{k}}\Gamma(j)$ with $I_{k+1}\backslash I_{k}=\{i_{k+1}\}$ .
We let take $j\in I_{k}$ such that $i_{k+1}\in\Gamma(j)$ . Set $H_{i_{k+1}}$ $:=[\Re_{k+1}=a_{i_{k+1}}]\cap F_{j}\cap$
$F_{i_{k+1}}$ . It can be verified that $\mu([a_{-j-i_{k+1}}=a_{-j-i_{k+1}}]|H_{i_{k+1}})=\phi_{-j-i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j})$ .
Dividing $\mu(F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})$ yields that
$\mu([a_{-j}=a_{-j}]|F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j})\mu([a_{i_{k+1}}=a_{i_{k+1}}]|F_{j}\cap F_{i_{k+1}})$.
Thus $\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-j})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-j-i_{k+1}})\phi_{j}^{t}(a_{i_{k+1}})$ ; then summing over $a_{I_{k}}$ we obtain
$\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})=\phi_{i_{k+1}}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}-i_{k+1}})\phi_{j}^{\infty}(a_{i_{k+1}})$ . It immediately follows from Proposi-
tion 1 that $\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{-I_{k}-i_{k+1}})\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{i_{k+1}})$ , as required.
Furthermore we can observe that all the other players $i$ than $j$ agree on the
same conjecture $\sigma_{j}(a_{j})=\phi_{i}^{\infty}(a_{j})$ about $j$ . We conclude that each action $a_{i}$
appearing with positive probability in $\sigma_{i}$ maximizes $g_{i}$ against the product of
the distributions $\sigma_{l}$ with $l\neq i$ . This implies that the profile $\sigma=(\sigma_{i})_{i\in N}$ is a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of $G$ , in completing the proof. $\square$
4 Concluding remarks
We have observed that in a communication process with revisions of players’
beliefs about the other actions, their predictions induces a mixed strategy Nash
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equilibrium of the game in the long run. Matsuhisa [4] established the same as-
sertion in the S4-know1edge model. Furthermore Matsuhisa [5] showed a similar
result for $\epsilon$-mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game in the
$S4$-knowledge model, which gives an epistemic aspect in Theorem of E. Kalai
and E. Lehrer [2]. This article highlights the Bayesian belief communication
with missing some information, and shows that the convergence to an exact
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed even in such the communication on approximate
information.
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